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COMPELLED SPEECH—CONNECTICUT AND MASSACHUSETTS:
INADVERTENTLY INVITING SUPPRESSION OF DISSIDENT
POLITICAL EXPRESSION
Joseph T. Poulsen *

	
  
People often argue that transparency in a democracy is
imperative. Transparency, though, may only be achieved
through disclosure. In recent years, the United States Supreme
Court has strongly favored compelled disclosure in the context
of political expression. Yet, there exists an exception to this
mandate for minor, dissident political parties. This exception,
established in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per
curiam), purports to shield those parties from threats,
harassment, and reprisals due to their minority status.
Historically this exception has been narrowly utilized to protect
Cold War era socialist political parties.
This Note argues that the Buckley minor-party exception
should be extended to not only encompass minor, partisan
political parties, but also issue-based minority groups and their
members. This Note will further argue that issue-oriented
expression through association deserves the same First
Amendment protection as direct advocacy; that association by
membership deserves greater protection than association
through monetary support; and that association by membership
is as strong as, and therefore deserves the same degree of
protection, as direct expression.
Absent such extension of the Buckley minor-party exception,
recent legislation enacted by Connecticut and Massachusetts, is
susceptible to a constitutional challenge by issue-oriented
minority groups and their members who are subject to
mandatory disclosure of personal information.	
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[C]ritique can . . . be a form of commitment, a means of laying a
claim. It’s the ultimate gesture of citizenship. A way of saying:
I’m not just passing through, I live here.1

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued several highly
publicized and controversial decisions concerning campaign
finance. The Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission2 upheld challenged disclosure requirements3 within
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 under the
justification that electoral transparency allows the electorate to
make informed decisions.4
However, since Citizens United,
anonymous spending by tax-exempt groups not subject to federal
disclosure laws has increased from approximately $69.2 million in
the 2008 federal election cycle,5 to approximately $308.7 million in
the 2012 cycle.6
Non-disclosed spending similarly increased
between non-presidential cycles.7 Further, a political network
	
  
*
Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2016. I
would like to offer my sincerest thanks to the Western New England Law Review staff
for their time and energy, my four wonderful parents for their unwavering support, and
my better half, Nicole, for her endless encouragement and patience.
1. Henry Louis Gates Jr., Patriotism, THE NATION, July 15, 1991, at 91.
2.
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3.
The challenged provision required a disclaimer to identify the person
responsible for the content of any electioneering communication funded by a noncandidate, as well as a disclosure statement filed with the Federal Election Commission
by any person who spent $10,000 or more on electioneering communications within a
calendar year. Id. at 366.
4.
Id. at 371.
5. 2008 Outside Spending, by Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&disp=O&type=U
&chrt=D [http://perma.cc/3GGG-Y84B] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
6. 2012 Outside Spending, by Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O
&type=U [http://perma.cc/M9AX-HL78] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). See also Russ
Choma, Money Won on Tuesday, But Rules of the Game Changed, CENTER FOR
RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/11/
money-won-on-tuesday-but-rules-of-the-game-changed/
[http://perma.cc/N4PMDUDV] (analyzing the influx of anonymous funding in the 2014 mid-term elections).
7. Compare 2014 Outside Spending, by Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2014&chrt=
D&disp=O&type=U [http://perma.cc/C6UW-E3GZ] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015)
(showing $173.2 million in non-disclosed spending), and 2010 Outside Spending, by
Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=D&disp=O&type=U
[http://perma.cc/6E3XL8EH] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (showing $135.6 million in non-disclosed spending)
with 2006 Outside Spending, by Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?
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created and run by Charles and David Koch plans to spend nearly
$900 million in 2016 federal elections, most of which would not
require donor disclosure.8 An organization created under Section
501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code9 is the primary tool utilized to
exploit a major disclosure law loophole.10 Exploitation occurs
when a 501(c) organization uses its own funds to pay for an
independent expenditure or other electioneering communication
which advocates for an issue or candidate in an election.11 This
loophole was less utilitarian prior to Citizens United because the
federal law Citizens United deemed unconstitutional, did not allow
corporations to fund express advocacy expenditures or
electioneering communications from their corporate treasuries.12
	
  
cycle=2006&chrt=D&disp=O&type=U [http://perma.cc/9RFJ-J3GJ] (last visited Oct.
30, 2015) (showing just $5.2 million in non-disclosed spending).
8.
Nicholas Confessore, Koch Brothers’ Budget of $889 Million for 2016 Is on
Par With Both Parties’ Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/01/27/us/politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html.
9.
26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2010). The most notable of which for the purposes of this
Note arise from 501(c)(4) and are known as social welfare groups. See generally
Terence Dougherty, Section 501(c)(4) Advocacy Organizations: Political CandidateRelated and Other Partisan Activities in Furtherance of the Social Welfare, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1337 (2013).
10. See 2008 Outside Spending, by Group, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&chrt=V&disp=O
&type=U [http://perma.cc/3GGG-Y84B] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015); 2012 Outside
Spending,
by
Group,
CENTER
FOR
RESPONSIVE
POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O
&type=U [http://perma.cc/M9AX-HL78] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). The loophole
exists because 501(c) organizations are overseen by the Internal Revenue Service
rather than a regulatory agency related to electoral law such as the Federal Election
Commission. The focus of the IRS is not to enforce electoral law but to ensure these
organizations qualify for tax-exempt status. Social welfare groups may therefore
participate in political advocacy, so long as their primary function remains “to further
the common good and general welfare of the people of the community (such as by
bringing about civic betterment and social improvements).” 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)
(2012). In effect these organizations may dedicate 49.9% of their funding to political
advocacy, while dedicating their remainder to issue advocacy. See Outside Spending:
Frequently Asked Questions About 501(c)(4) Groups, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/faq.php [http://perma.cc/Y8PSU5BC] (last visited Jan. 31, 2015); Emma Schwartz, The Rules That Govern 501(c)(4)s,
PBS (Oct. 30, 2012, 9:12 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/governmentelections-politics/big-sky-big-money/the-rules-that-govern-501c4s/
[http://perma.cc/J4L5-HYX2].
11. The definition of an independent expenditure and electioneering
communication varies by jurisdiction. See Thomas B. Edsall, In Defense of
Anonymous Political Giving, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
03/19/opinion/edsall-in-defense-of-anonymous-political-giving.html [http://perma.cc/U6
WM-9DVA].
12. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66. See also The Editorial Board, Dark
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As a result of the influx of so-called “dark money” in politics,
many states now promote increased political transparency with
revamped laws that conform to Citizens United by disclosing, at
minimum, the names and addresses of supporters of candidates,
political parties, and other electoral groups.13 However, by
attempting to create greater political transparency, newly enacted
state statutes may infringe on a person’s First Amendment right to
free speech by disallowing anonymous expression.
This
infringement can operate as a complete, yet unintended, bar to
minority or dissident viewpoints.14 Transparency is an important,
admirable objective, but vigorous legislative debate is required to
evaluate the far-reaching effects compelled disclosure laws have on
our entire political system.
Anonymous expression has an
important role in the political process. In fact, many of the
country’s founding fathers used pseudonyms to publish political
writings, such as the Federalist Papers and Anti-Federalist Papers.15
The Supreme Court in recent years has generally favored
disclosure laws.16 However, some contemporary proponents of
anonymity argue the First Amendment protects anonymous
electoral expression, such as spending, and cite Patterson17 and
McIntrye v. Ohio Elections Commission18 in support of that
	
  
Money
Helped
Win
the
Senate,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Nov.
8,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/opinion/sunday/dark-money-helped-win-thesenate.html?smid=tw-share (discussing the effect of dark money on races for the U.S.
Senate in the 2014 mid-term elections); William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona:
Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 864
(2011) (“[D]isclosure failed colossally in the 2010 election. The upside-down rules
reached their absurd climax, exposing numerous instances of small-scale citizen
participation but concealing the giant influence of financially and politically powerful
entities.”).
13. See generally Mark Pazniokas, Malloy Signs Campaign Finance Law that
Loosens Restrictions, THE CONNECTICUT MIRROR, (June 19, 2013),
http://ctmirror.org/malloy-signs-campaign-finance-law-loosens-restrictions/;
Shira
Schoenberg, Massachusetts House passes Super PAC disclosure bill, MASS LIVE (July
31, 2014, 7:28 AM), http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/07/massachusetts_
house_passes_sup.html [http://perma.cc/MY7D-E6BD].
14. See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
15. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (published under the
name “Publius”); THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
University of Chicago Press 2007).
16. See John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S.
93 (2003).
17. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 449. See infra Part I.A.
18. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). See infra Part I.A.
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proposition.19
They assert the First Amendment’s umbrella
protects dissenters and those with minority viewpoints from
threats, harassment, and retaliation.20
The Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, created an exception
to compelled disclosure when a minor political party faces a
reasonable probability of receiving threats, harassment, or
reprisals.21 Yet, the Supreme Court has not clarified what degree
of threat, harassment, or reprisal is sufficient to satisfy this
standard. Additionally, Citizens United was decided with no
reference to Patterson despite its substantial relevance.22 The
result is that Citizens United created a precarious framework that
states are attempting to emulate, thereby leaving themselves
susceptible to an as-applied challenge23 by a minority or dissident
party on the basis of Patterson.24
This Note argues that the Buckley minor-party exception
should be extended to not only encompass minor, partisan political
parties, but also issue-based minority groups and their members.
Additionally, this Note argues that issue-oriented expression
through association deserves the same First Amendment protection
as direct advocacy. Further, this Note contend that association by
membership deserves greater protection than association through
monetary means. Finally, this Note will conclude that association
by membership is as strong as, and therefore deserves the same
degree of protection, as the express speech at issue in McIntyre.
The result of such would be to recognize a right of anonymous
association.
Part I of this Note explores relevant Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding disclosure25 pertaining to politics. Part
II.A will distinguish true minority advocates from those who are
merely out of power. Part II.B will argue a low evidentiary level of
threats, harassment, and reprisals is appropriate to overcome a
	
  
19. Edsall, supra note 11.
20. Id.
21. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam).
22. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
23. An as-applied challenge alleges a particular law or policy is constitutional on
its face, but is unconstitutional as it is applied to a particular person, group, or class,
whereas a facial challenge alleges a particular law or policy may never be
constitutional. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
24. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310.
25. The personal information required for disclosure varies between the various
state and federal laws. See infra Part I.A–B. Generally, the personal information to be
disclosed at least includes: name, address, occupation, employer, and business address.
See infra Part I.A–B.
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state’s informational interest and therefore does not need to rise to
the level seen in Patterson. Part II.C defines the strength of
associational speech in relation to other forms of speech and will
argue associational speech based on membership is as strong as
express speech, and therefore deserves the same degree of
protection. Part II.D will argue that Patterson fits within the
Citizens United framework. Finally, Part III will examine recently
enacted legislation from Connecticut and Massachusetts that aims
to comply with Citizens United and will argue the revamped
Connecticut and Massachusetts disclosure laws are each susceptible
to as-applied challenges by minority advocates due to infringement
of their freedom to associate.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT AND COMPELLED DISCLOSURE

A. Exceptions to Compelled Disclosure: Where the First
Amendment Prevails
In 1958 the freedom to associate was first recognized by the
Supreme Court as a right under the First Amendment in
Patterson.26 In that case, an Alabama statute required foreign
corporations to register with the Secretary of State to do business
within the state.27 The Alabama Attorney General initiated an
equity action against the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (hereinafter “NAACP”) to
prevent the NAACP from doing business within, and to expel them
from the State.28 Alabama requested the NAACP produce a large
quantity of documents and records that included “the names and
addresses of all Alabama members and agents of the
Association.”29
The NAACP then produced all requested
documentation, including names and addresses of all officers and
agents, except a list identifying rank-and-file members.30 The
	
  
26. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
27. Id. at 451.
28. Id. at 452. The complaint alleged the NAACP’s business in Alabama
included providing legal assistance to minority students who sought admission to a state
university and support of a bus line boycott that sought equal seating for passengers
regardless of race. Id.
29. Id. at 453 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. These “rank-and-file” members were those who had no positions of
power, authority, or decision making within the NAACP. Id. For example, many (if
not all) of these “rank-and-file” members were unpaid volunteers. Brief for Petitioner
at 7, Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958) (No. 91, October Term, 1957), 1957 WL 55387 (U.S.), at *7.
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NAACP was held in contempt and fined $100,000.31
Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the NAACP argued that
production and disclosure of membership lists would “abridge the
rights of its rank-and-file members to engage in lawful association
in support of their common beliefs.”32 The Court recognized the
right to associate when it held,
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by
group association . . . . It is beyond debate that freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas
is an inseparable aspect of the “liberty” assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33

Additionally, it is not necessary for associational rights to be
directly restricted, rather, governmental action which in effect
discourages exercise of indispensable liberties may be found to be
an “unconstitutional intimidation” upon such rights.34 Importantly,
the Court stated privacy is a particularly indispensable aspect of
freedom of association for groups with dissident viewpoints.35
Applying the newly recognized freedom of association to the
issue, the Court found that rank-and-file members were subjected
to “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility” simply by
disclosing their identity.36 Threats, harassment, or reprisals of that
nature and magnitude would only discourage potential members
from joining while encouraging then-current members to leave the
NAACP.37 The Court ruled a state must have a compelling interest
to overcome freedom of association and that Alabama’s proposed
interest to ensure the NAACP’s statutory compliance regarding its
intrastate business activities did not meet that standard of “closest
scrutiny.”38
	
  
31. Id. at 454. The equivalent purchasing power of that sum in 2015 dollars is
approximately $874,797.79. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=100%2C000.00&year1=1956&year2=2015
[http://perma.cc/3U4Y-GQL2] (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
32. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 461.
35. Id. at 462.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 463.
38. Id. at 461, 464. Closest scrutiny is not to be confused with strict scrutiny used
in other subsequent constitutional contexts; however, the requisite standard of a
compelling governmental interest is the same in each standard. See Anthony
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Patterson and its immediate progeny39 arose during the
tumultuous civil rights era. Thus, freedom of association was
recognized to protect “civil rights activists in the segregated
South”40 from compelled disclosure, which would have subjected
those persons to threats, harassment, or reprisals, all physical and
economic in nature.41 As a result of applying closest scrutiny in
cases dealing with the violent segregated South and McCarthy-era
blacklists, it was unclear how high the Court set the standard of
threats, harassment, or reprisals for future persons to defend
against disclosure by asserting freedom of association.42
Contemporary political advocacy is often contentious, but
advocates usually do not face the same threat of serious harm as
those from the civil rights era.43 While deeming Patterson’s
disclosure law an unconstitutional restriction on associational
freedom, in other cases the Court has analyzed express political
speech differently when anonymity protects a speaker who faces
harm that is less serious than seen by rank-and-file NAACP
members. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission illustrates the
proposition that an individual who expresses her point of view on a
contentious political issue may be protected from disclosure to
ensure that her viewpoint is not silenced from public debate.44 At
issue was a disclosure statute that the Ohio Supreme Court deemed
constitutional on the basis that it was a part of the electoral process
and only imposed a “‘reasonable’ and ‘nondiscriminatory’ burden
on the rights of voters.”45
	
  
Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413, 424 n.67
(2012) (discussing the Supreme Court’s standards of review in First Amendment
contexts as having similar tests to standards of review in other constitutional contexts
(i.e. “exacting scrutiny” in Buckley with “intermediate scrutiny.”)).
39. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
40. McGeveran, supra note 12 at 866.
41. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 461, 466.
42. The standard may be that persons must face the very same form and degree
of threats, harassment, or reprisals manifested in NAACP v. Alabama and Brown v.
Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
See
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1206 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Supreme
Court precedent regarding the appropriate standard of review is not a model of
clarity.”).
43. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 16 n.12, Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of
Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (No. 91, October Term,
1957), 1957 WL 55387 (U.S.), at *16 n.12 (citing actual contemporary instances of
“[t]hreats and . . . acts of violence . . . directed against Negroes” who sought “to assist
their constitutional rights”).
44. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
45. Id. at 345 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 154
(1993)).
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The challenger to the Ohio disclosure statute, Margaret
McIntyre, was fined after distributing anonymous leaflets that
advocated against a school tax levy at issue in an upcoming
referendum.46 McIntyre wrote the contents, manufactured, and
distributed the leaflets herself.47 The Ohio statute barred advocacy
intended to influence voters without the producer’s name, business
and residential addresses.48 Importantly, some of the leaflets were
signed by McIntyre while others were signed “CONCERNED
PARENTS AND TAXPAYERS” in violation of Ohio’s statute.49
There was no indication the leaflets’ contents were “false,
misleading, or libelous.”50
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that the First
Amendment protects an author’s choice of anonymity.51 That
choice may be made due to fear of threats, harassment, reprisals,
social ostracism, to preserve privacy, or to strengthen the
persuasiveness of an assertion.52 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, emphasized those rationales’ deep roots in American
history by using the Federalist Papers and the secret ballot as
illustrative examples.53
While the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the statute on the basis
that it was a part of the electoral process, because it only applied to
speech designed to influence elections, and only imposed a
“‘reasonable’ and ‘nondiscriminatory’ burden on the rights of
voters,”54 the United States Supreme Court determined the statute
was a regulation of the content of “pure speech” rather than the
“mechanics of the electoral process.”55 Further, the content of the
pamphlet constituted “core” speech as defined in Buckley v.
Valeo,56 and thus is subject to exacting scrutiny.57 In fact,
	
  
46. Id. at 337.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 338 n.3.
49. Id. at 337.
50. Id. A state has an interest in informing the electorate, which satisfies
exacting scrutiny. See infra Part I.B.
51. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
52. Id. at 341–42.
53. Id. at 343 n.6. Justice Stevens also used blind-graded exams in law school as a
modern attempt to eliminate bias through anonymity. Id. at 342 n.5. See also Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (“Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and
even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.”).
54. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344–45 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,
618 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1993)).
55. Id. at 345.
56. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (“Discussion of public
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McIntyre’s type of speech, advocacy regarding a contentious
political issue, “is the essence of First Amendment expression.”58
Ohio proffered two allegedly overriding interests to uphold
the statute: to prevent fraudulent and libelous advocacy, and to
create an informed electorate.59 Providing an electorate with
information pertaining to the identity of an advocate does not
change the content of an assertion, and may not even enhance the
voter’s ability to assess its validity.60 Indeed, as Margaret McIntyre
was an individual, a voter would need to personally know her for
McIntyre’s identity, as the pamphlet’s scrivener, to be of any use to
the voter in assessing the merits of its contents.61 Therefore, the
informational interest was held insufficient to satisfy exacting
scrutiny.62
While the Court agreed that preventing fraud and libel during
election season carried “special weight,” the fact that other
safeguards existed to prevent fraud and libel, demonstrated that
compelled disclosure served only to supplement those other
safeguards.63 The disclosure provision did not satisfy the exacting
scrutiny standard as it applied to speech that was in no way
fraudulent or libelous and therefore was judged overly broad.64 As
	
  
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords
the broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people.’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1948)). While Buckley
involved political speech concerning a candidate for office, those principles apply
equally to issue-based elections, as seen in McIntyre. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.
57. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346. Exacting scrutiny requires a law burdening core
political speech to be “narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.” Id. at
347. Further, “[w]hile [exacting scrutiny] resembles what the Court has termed
intermediate scrutiny elsewhere, the Court itself does not draw that analogy in other
First Amendment contexts.” Johnstone, supra note 38.
58. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.
59. Id. at 348.
60. Id. at 348–49.
Don’t underestimate the common man. People are intelligent enough to
evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They can see it is
anonymous. They know it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity
along with its message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to
read that message. And then, once they have done so, it is for them to
decide what is ‘responsible’, what is valuable, and what is truth.
Id. at 348–49 n.11 (1995) (quoting People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (1974)).
61. Id. at 348–49.
62. Id. at 349.
63. Id. at 350. Those other safeguards were specific and detailed prohibitions
located within Ohio’s Election Code. Id. at 349–50 n.12.
64. Id. at 351.
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a result, the disclosure provision was not sufficient to prevent fraud
and libel,65 and consequently, violated the First Amendment.66
Despite McIntyre’s narrow holding, which considered only
Ohio’s blanket prohibition of anonymous campaign literature, the
Court’s rationale allowed for a more expansive use for individuals
for two reasons.67 First, prior cases that upheld compelled
disclosure laws were distinguished as being a less intrusive
infringement on First Amendment rights in light of more
compelling state interests.68
However, as the Court noted,
compelled disclosure of an individual engaging in “core” speech is
more intrusive than disclosure of the identity of a contributor of an
independent expenditure.69 In fact, speech expressed by monetary
means is generally less controversial and therefore less likely to
invoke threats, harassment, or reprisals because it is “less specific,
less personal, and less provocative.”70 Second, regardless of
individuals’ reasons to desire anonymity, the interest in having
anonymous writings within the “marketplace of ideas
unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring
disclosure as a condition of entry.”71
Thus, McIntyre stands as a strong shield to those individuals
who speak72 anonymously about controversial political issues,
despite the possibility of fraudulent or libelous misuse of such a
right.73 Further, the McIntyre shield protects not only individuals’
First Amendment freedoms, but also the “marketplace of ideas” as
	
  
65. Id. at 353.
66. Id. at 356.
67. McGeveran, supra note 121 at 859 (“The rationale for the [McIntyre] Court’s
decision was a robust understanding of privacy rights for political speech and
association.”). See also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 166 n.14 (2002) (“[T]he [challengers] do not themselves object to a loss of
anonymity . . . . We may . . . consider the impact of this ordinance on the free speech
rights of individuals who are deterred from speaking because the registration provision
would require them to forgo their right to speak anonymously.”); Buckley v. Am.
Const. Law Found., Inc. 525 U.S. 182, 199 (1999) (“Our decision in McIntyre . . . is
instructive . . . .”).
68. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356. Those other statutes were considered less
intrusive because, in part, they applied only to candidate elections. Id. at 353.
69. Id. at 355 (explaining that the Court explicitly distinguished Buckley); see
infra Part I.B.
70. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 355.
71. Id. at 342.
72. “Speak” here refers only to written advocacy.
73. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357. “[I]n general, our society accords greater weight
to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse.” Id.
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a matter of public policy.74
B. The Supreme Court’s Evolution in Upholding Federal
Disclosure Laws
Compelled disclosure in the political arena has been
increasingly favored by the Supreme Court since McIntyre.75 These
recent cases invoke an earlier principle, established by Buckley v.
Valeo, that a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or
reprisals is necessary to form a constitutional challenge of
compelled disclosure laws.76 Interestingly, no mention is made of
McIntyre and this post-McIntyre jurisprudence ignores McIntyre’s
protection of core political speech in favor of an earlier principal
that such speech need only be protected when faced with threats,
harassment, or reprisals.77 The standard of review for reporting
and disclosure requirements was established in Buckley v. Valeo,
which relied on Patterson.78
Buckley included a challenge to portions of federal law that
required a political committee to disclose the name and address of
any donor who contributed more than ten dollars as well as the
occupation and principal place of business of any donor who
contributed greater than one hundred dollars in the aggregate.79
The Court applied exacting scrutiny, a standard requiring a
“relevant correlation” or “substantial relation” between a
legitimate government interest and the disclosed information.80
	
  
74. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
75. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
See also BRIAN K. PINAIRE, THE CONSTITUTION OF ELECTORAL SPEECH LAW: THE
SUPREME COURT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS
154 (2008) (“[A]nonymity claims have been trumped in other cases by the asserted
democratic interest in disclosure as a kind of mechanism for regulation in the political
marketplace.”).
76. See McGeveran, supra note 12, at 860.
77. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam).
78. Id. at 64. See also Johnstone, supra note 38, at 423 (“Buckley cited NAACP
for its standard of review, but loosened the strict ‘closest scrutiny’ standard to the
ironically imprecise ‘exacting scrutiny’ standard.”).
79. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 62–63. “Political committee is defined . . . as a group of
persons that receives contributions or makes expenditures of over $1,000 in a calendar
year. Both definitions [of contributions and expenditures] focus on the use of money
or other objects of value for the purpose of . . . influencing the nomination or election
of any person to federal office.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Portions of Buckley
involved facial challenges to the law; however, this Note is concerned only with the
portions of Buckley that involve as-applied analysis.
80. Id. at 64.
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Notably, the Court deviated from Patterson’s “strictest scrutiny”
standard, which applies, when “beliefs sought to be advanced by
association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural
matters.”81 While it acknowledged a strict test was necessary due to
the possibility of substantial infringement of First Amendment
rights, Buckley identified three categories of governmental interest
that survive exacting scrutiny.82
The first category is an informational interest to provide the
electorate with relevant information about a candidate.83 This
interest is justified in that voters may be better equipped to
evaluate a candidate’s ideology and determine what interests that
candidate may be beholden to once in office.84 The second
category of interest is the deterrence of “actual corruption and
avoid[ing] the appearance of corruption by exposing large
contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.”85 The last
category of interest arises when recordkeeping and reporting the
information provided by disclosure provisions are necessary to
enforce contribution limitations.86
Buckley’s as-applied challenge contended the disclosure
provisions were overbroad regarding contributions “to minor
parties and independent candidates because the governmental
interest in this information is minimal and the danger of significant
infringement on First Amendment rights is greatly increased.”87
The Court determined the minor party or independent candidate
needed to actually demonstrate threats, harassment, or reprisals as
the NAACP showed in Patterson.88 “[Patterson] is inapposite
where . . . any serious infringement on First Amendment rights
brought about by the compelled disclosure of contributors is highly
speculative” despite the government’s diminished interest.89
However, the door was left open for a successful challenge if a
challenger could provide “record evidence of the sort proffered in
[Patterson].”90
	
  
81. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460–61.
82. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
83. Id. at 66–67.
84. Id. See also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369 (holding that attaining an
informed electorate as the only interest needed to justify a disclosure provision).
85. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
86. Id. at 67–68.
87. Id. at 68–69.
88. Id. at 69.
89. Id. at 70.
90. Id. at 71.
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The challenger argued “a minor party, particularly a new
party, may never be able to prove a substantial threat of
harassment, however real that threat may be, because it would be
required to come forward with witnesses who are too fearful to
contribute but not too fearful to testify about their fear.”91 The
Court acknowledged a heavy burden was imposed to prove injury,
especially for a minor party, and so only a “reasonable probability”
needed to be present to show compelled disclosure would subject
contributors to threats, harassment, or reprisals.92
The McIntyre Court, which found an individual who expresses
her point of view on a contentious political issue may be protected
from disclosure to ensure that her viewpoint is not silenced from
public debate, distinguished Buckley in two ways. First, Margaret
McIntyre’s independent actions had no implications concerning a
candidate, thus eliminating actual or apparent corruption.93
Second, disclosure of core political speech—such as Ms. McIntyre’s
independent expenditure by producing election-related leaflets—
was not useful to the electorate and was “particularly intrusive” to
her.94
The Court’s first major decision that turned away from
McIntyre’s protection of core political speech in favor of Buckley’s
reasonable probability of Patterson-type harm requirement was
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.95 The court in
McConnell upheld the district court’s application of the Buckley
standard, which stated, “[a]lthough this testimony demonstrates
that [organization] members may ‘fear’ the potential consequences
of their names being disclosed in connection with [the
organization], there is no evidence before the Court that these
feared consequences have been, or would be, realized.”96 This
application requires “specific” evidence of an incoming, or actual,
realization event of threats, harassment, or reprisals.97 The
implications are staggering; an individual must comply with
disclosure requirements and subject herself to possible death
	
  
91. Id. at 73–74.
92. Id. at 74.
93. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 354.
94. Id. at 355.
95. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
96. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 246 (D.D.C.)
judgment entered, 251 F. Supp. 2d 948 (D.D.C. 2003) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) and aff’d in part, rev’d in
part sub nom. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
97. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 199.
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threats or loss of gainful employment for merely associating herself
with an organization in support (or in opposition) of a candidate or
issue. Only then may that individual challenge the disclosure law,
as an as-applied challenger, or as an aggrieved party under a facial
challenge, at which point action would be futile.98
The disclosure laws at issue in McConnell were challenged in
Citizens United.99
The Citizens United Court affirmed
McConnell’s disclosure provisions, but went further by holding an
informational interest alone was sufficient to satisfy exacting
scrutiny.100 The Court explained, “disclosure permits citizens and
shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper
way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages.”101 The Court further stated commercial speech may be
subject to electoral campaign disclosure laws under certain
circumstances.102
The challenger’s argument for the Buckley minor-party
exception was quickly rejected when it could not put forward
specific evidence that its members would face threats, harassment,
or reprisals in the event of disclosure.103 However, the Supreme
Court acknowledged the exception for minor parties remained
available on a case-by-case basis.
Therefore, the state’s
informational interest is currently the most important justification
to satisfy exacting scrutiny.104
C.

Applying the Buckley Exception to a Minor Political Party
In Brown v. Socialist Workers,105 the Socialist Workers Party

	
  
98. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 203 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he asapplied exemption becomes practically worthless if speakers cannot obtain the
exemption quickly and well in advance of speaking.”).
99. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366.
100 . Id. at 369 (holding for the first time an informational interest alone was
sufficient to overcome exacting scrutiny). See generally McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam).
101. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371.
102. Id. at 369. A documentary regarding then-Senator Hilary Clinton was at
issue. Id. at 319–320. “Potentially . . . even ads from a competitor business that
criticize a business owned by a candidate could be regulable ads if the ads are run
directly before an election and mention the candidate.” Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the
Tide Turned In Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens
United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1081 (2011).
103. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.
104. Johnstone, supra note 38, at 422.
105. Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87
(1982).
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(“SWP”), a small Ohio-based political party with approximately
sixty members, in a 1974 class action, challenged an Ohio statute
that required disclosure of the names and addresses of every
monetary contributor and recipient of campaign disbursements.106
The law required disclosure regardless of the size of the
contribution or disbursement.107 Any failure to comply was
punishable by a fine of $1,000 per day.108
The SWP sought to effectuate its ideals entirely through the
political process.109 When it ran a candidate in the 1980 United
States Senate race, the SWP received less than two percent of the
vote.110 It was such a small-scale party that it averaged only $15,000
annually in contributions between 1974 and 1980.111
The SWP successfully challenged the law’s constitutionality
under the Buckley minor-party exception, as-applied to itself.112
The state of Ohio conceded that the exception applied to
contributors, but argued it did not apply to recipients of campaign
disbursements.113 The Supreme Court rejected this “narrow” view
of the Buckley minor-party exception.114 It reasoned that the
government’s interest was weaker in comparison with the threat
facing minor parties’ First Amendment rights.115 The individuals
who make contributions and receive disbursements are those
whose actions “lie at the very core of the First Amendment.”116
Disclosure of these persons’ identities would subject them to
“threats, harassment, and reprisals.”117 Moreover, “[t]he fact that
some or even many recipients of campaign expenditures may not
be exposed to the risk of public hostility does not detract from the
serious threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights of those
who are so exposed.”118
The framework established by these cases contains
ambiguities, which leaves open the possibility of expansion of the
	
  
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 88–89.
Id. at 91 n.6.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 97 n.14.
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Buckley minor-party exception. The Court in Patterson and
Brown expanded the robustness of the First Amendment, and in
McIntyre “codified the anonymous speech doctrine.”119 This
framework allows for the recognition of a right of anonymous
association for minor, issue-oriented advocates.
II. CONNECTING SEEMINGLY DEVIATING JURISPRUDENCE
Part A of this section will argue which minority advocates
ought to be exempt from disclosure. Part B will argue the degree
of severity of threats, harassment, and reprisals necessary to
overcome a state’s informational interest does not need to arise to
that seen in Patterson. Part C will argue that the strength of
associational speech is greater than that of speech expressed by
monetary transfer. Finally, Part D will conclude that the right to
associate expressed in Patterson falls within the framework created
by Citizens United.
A. Establishing Which Minority-Advocates Ought to be Exempt
from Disclosure
The Citizens United Court reaffirmed the Buckley minorparty exception applicability in the context of electoral
disclosure.120 However, the Court has yet to define who or what
constitutes a minor-party for the purposes of this exception. As a
result, there are those, such as Charles and David Koch, who
advocate widely-popular views, yet claim they are themselves
dissenters who qualify for the Buckley minor-party exception
because those views are in discord with the political party in
office.121 That argument is deceptive at best. A vast divergence
exists between Margaret McIntyre,122 the NAACP’s 1950s Alabama
chapter123 and the Koch brothers who have an estimated combined
net worth of $80 billon.124 Indeed, the Kochs’ political network has
	
  
119. Jason M. Shepard & Genelle Belmas, Anonymity, Disclosure and First
Amendment Balancing in the Internet Era: Developments in Libel, Copyright, and
Election Speech, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 92, 103.
120. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010).
121. See Edsall, supra note 11 (quoting Rob Tappan, a spokesman for Koch
Industries).
122. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
123. See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
124. Louis Jacobson, Harry Reid Says Koch Brothers are Richest Family in the
World, POLITIFACT.COM, (Apr. 2, 2014, 2:32 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2014/apr/02/harry-reid/harry-reid-says-koch-brothers-are-richest-
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been described as, in effect, a third major political party.125
Accordingly, while the Kochs are only two individuals, their
monetary worth coupled with their stated intent, gives them
exceedingly greater influence in the political arena than the
majority of other individuals. Though, conversely, as seen in
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen,126 the proponent of popular,
though not necessarily majoritarian, viewpoints should also not be
protected by the minor-party exception.127 The result is that too
much power or influence, whether by monetary means or number
of supporters, disqualifies advocates from minority status.
Moreover, the ProtectMarriage.com lower court, relying on
Socialist Workers, set a high bar for future minor-parties when
applying the Buckley minor-party exception. It determined the
same-sex marriage opponents were not a minor-party because they
had neither a small constituency nor did they promote a historically
unpopular idea.128 As a result, that court viewed minor status as a
“necessary element of a successful as-applied claim” but not
sufficient without “seeking to further ideas historically and
pervasively rejected and vilified by both this country’s government
and its citizens.”129
Thus, while the court was correct in
determining the same-sex marriage opponents were not a minorparty, it created a difficult burden for minority groups with new
and ostracized viewpoints from gaining protection under the
Buckley exception.
Therefore, the Court should adopt a subjective spectrum,
based upon certain factors, that affords true minority-advocacy
groups protection under the Buckley exception to disclosure,
whether their views are historically or newly despised. Relevant
	
  
family-w/ [http://perma.cc/2T9W-RK2C]. See also The World’s Billionaires, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (ranking the wealthiest
people on the planet with Charles and David Koch tied individually at six).
125. Confessore, supra note 8.
126. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1216 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
See infra Part II.B.
127. Interestingly, the lack of clarity in Supreme Court compelled disclosure
jurisprudence may be due, in part, to the Justices’ consciousness of the particular issue
in each case. See McGeveran, supra note 12 at 870 n.75.
It is possible that the Justices’ views were colored by the nature of the
particular issue in [Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010)], a referendum to
repeal gay rights legislation. It may be coincidence, but Justices generally
seen as more likely to support gay rights wrote the opinions most skeptical
about the prospect of as-applied exemptions in Doe and vice versa.
Id.
128. ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
129. Id. at 1215.
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factors should include: tenuousness of the group’s finances, degree
of unpopularity, and members’ interests in the group’s success. On
the spectrum, as the members’ interests increase, so too should the
Court’s willingness to allow Buckley’s exception.
B. Defining the Level of Harassment Necessary to Overcome the
State’s Informational Interest
The Supreme Court held in Buckley v. Valeo that the First
Amendment prohibits the government from compelling disclosure
from minor political parties if the party can show “a reasonable
probability that the compelled disclosure of a party’s contributors’
names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from
either Government officials or private parties.”130
Yet, the Court did not put forth a test to determine what type,
degree, or level of threat, harassment, or reprisal is necessary to
satisfy the disclosure exception. In creating the Buckley minorparty exception, the Court relied upon the strong evidence of
threats and harassment put forward in Patterson.131 That reliance,
though, was on the amount and specificity of the evidence put
forth, rather than the type, degree, or level of threats, harassment,
or reprisals faced by members.132 Subsequent cases used Patterson
as the standard to judge threats, harassment, and reprisals.133 This
Note proposes that a subjective evaluation is the proper standard a
court should use to assess as-applied challenges. Further, the
standard should be proactive—to prevent actual instances of
threats, harassment, and reprisals—rather than reactionary by
requiring present or past instances of such.
This proposal can be illustrated using the facts of
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, where a class of major donors and
other advocacy groups challenged a ballot initiative to California’s
Political Reform Act of 1974.134 The proponents of the initiative
sought to define “marriage” as only “between a man and a woman”
and the plaintiffs alleged that contributors to the cause faced
	
  
130. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam). This exception was
adopted in Citizens United but will be referred to as the Buckley minor-party
exception. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010).
131. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71.
132. Id.
133. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87
(1982); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); ProtectMarriage.com v.
Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
134. ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.
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threats, harassment, and reprisals.135 There was evidence of
numerous instances of threats, harassment, and reprisals against
supporters of the ballot.136 A threat made to the Mayor of Fresno,
California stated:
If I had a gun I would have gunned you down along with each
and every other supporter . . . . Anybody who has a YES ON
PROP 8 sign or banner in fron [sic] of their house or bumper
sticker on the car in Fresno is in danger of being shot or
firebombed. Fresno is not safe for anyone who supports Prop 8
. . . . If you thought 9/11 was bad, you haven’t seen anything
yet.137

Economic reprisals included, “[the] manager of El Coyote
restaurant took a voluntary leave of absence after reports of her
$100 donation to support Proposition 8 led to boycotts and
protestors at the establishment owned by her mother.”138 In
another instance, California disclosure laws required an individual
contributor to provide the name of his business when making a
monetary contribution, such as the plaintiff donors made, to
effectuate their advocacy. As a result, cars in the parking lot of his
business were “papered” with flyers detailing his monetary
support.139 Additionally, a sponsored link appeared on Google
when searching for that same individual, which referenced his
monetary support of the plaintiff advocacy groups.140
The court in ProtectMarriage.com observed the threats,
harassment, and reprisals in evidence were insufficient to satisfy
the Buckley minor-party exception test.141 The court’s holding,
however, was based on the plaintiffs not being covered by the
“minority party” requirement of the Buckley exception, as they
were not a group with a “small constituenc[y] and [did not]
promot[e] historically unpopular and almost universally-rejected
ideas.”142 The court further stated the facts at issue were
distinguishable from prior cases because the threats, harassment,
and reprisals took place “during the heat of an election battle
	
  
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 1199–1200.
See id.
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1201.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1216.
Id.
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surrounding a hotly contested ballot initiative.”143
This viewpoint is in direct opposition to the Supreme Court’s
1995 decision in McIntyre. McIntyre emphasized that contentious,
issue based political speech is “the essence of First Amendment
expression.”144 While McIntyre involved a local, school tax issue,
which surely can be acrimonious, it does not invoke the same level
of passion and emotion as does same-sex marriage, which has
become one of the most hotly debated and pivotal civil rights issues
of the past decade.145 Nonetheless, “[n]o form of speech is entitled
to greater constitutional protection than Mrs. McIntyre’s.”146
Therefore, while the plaintiffs in ProtectMarriage.com were unable
to show threats, harassment, and reprisals of the same severity as
the plaintiffs in Patterson and Socialist Workers, the threats and
harassment shown by the ProtectMarriage.com plaintiffs should be
sufficient for future similar challengers to invoke the Buckley
minor-party exception.
Similarly, the same ballot initiative in ProtectMarriage.com,
was the focal point in Hollingsworth v. Perry.147 Defendants
applied for a stay of an order allowing the trial of an action
challenging the affirmed ballot to be broadcast by video and audio
means, to other federal courthouses.148 To grant the stay, the
	
  
143. Id. at 1217.
144. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
145. Id. at 337. Cf. Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459
U.S. 87, 98 n.14 (1982) (“The preservation of unorthodox political affiliations in public
records substantially increases the potential for harassment above and beyond the risk
that an individual faces simply as a result of having worked for an unpopular party at
one time.”). Compare Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Delivers Tacit Win to Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/07/us/denyingreview-justices-clear-way-for-gay-marriage-in-5-states.html
[http://perma.cc/2VLVUZZ7] (discussing the Supreme Court’s move to let appeals court rulings stand, thus in
effect allowing same-sex marriage to expand to thirty states), and Nate Silver,
Explaining the Senate’s Surge in Support for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT BLOG (Apr. 4, 2013 8:13 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes
.com/2013/04/04/explaining-the-senates-surge-in-support-for-same-sex-marriage/?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/U6EN-VPB3?type=source] (analyzing the rapid increase of U.S.
Senators in support of same-sex marriage), with David D. Kirkpatrick, Backers of Gay
Marriage Ban Find Tepid Response in Pews, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/16/us/backers-of-gay-marriage-ban-find-tepidresponse-in-pews.html (discussing attempts by conservative groups to impose bans on
same-sex civil unions and marriage in light of Massachusetts becoming the first state to
allow same-sex marriage).
146. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347. See also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978) (finding speech regarding an income tax referendum “is at the
heart of the First Amendment’s protection”).
147. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010).
148. Id. at 184–85.
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applicants were required to show that irreparable harm would
result absent a denial of the stay.149 The Court granted the stay as
the defendants successfully showed prior instances of harassment
surrounding the ballot initiative.150
Consequently, witness
testimony would be chilled as they had reason to believe they
would face harassment by being exposed during a nation-wide
broadcast.151 Accordingly, if threats, harassment, and reprisals
against witnesses are egregious enough to procure a restricted trial,
the same threats, harassment, and reprisals should be sufficient to
satisfy Buckley’s minor party exception to disclosure. Crucially,
this argument only applies to the rank-and-file-esque member who
does nothing more than donate to or associate with an advocacy
group.
It would not apply in the example from
ProtectMarriage.com above, regarding the Fresno Mayor, because
he is a public figure who attended a public rally. It also does not
apply to members who openly broadcast their support by bumper
stickers, signs in front lawns, or similar modes.152
Additionally, although the Court in Citizens United held that
the informational justification alone was sufficient to warrant
disclosure, this argument is only persuasive if the disclosure
actually results in a more informed electorate.153 The Buckley
minor-party exception should only be overcome in narrow
circumstances. The fact that more information is available, i.e.
donor names of minority groups, does not automatically create a
more well informed voter. For example, McIntyre involved an
individual who wrote and printed leaflets on her own accord.154 No
evidence suggested Ms. McIntyre was any more prominent a citizen
than any other voter in her district.155 Unless she were a public
figure, or otherwise invested in the result for reasons her fellow
voters would find repugnant, the electorate was no better off
	
  
149. Id. at 190.
150. Id. at 195.
151. Id. at 195–96.
152. See also Dale E. Ho, NAACP v. Alabama and False Symmetry in the
Disclosure Debate, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 405 (2012) (discussing economic
reprisals in the form of consumer boycotts resulting from a retailer’s support of a
Minnesota gubernatorial candidate opposed to same-sex marriage).
153. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 369–70 (2010). But
cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 237 (1976) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“The public right to know ought not be absolute when its
exercise reveals private political convictions . . . . On the contrary, secrecy and privacy
as to political preferences and convictions are fundamental in a free society.”).
154. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 337 (1995).
155. See id.
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reading her name at the bottom of the leaflets than if they were not
signed. The content of the message would have remained exactly
the same—just as true or false. As the Court noted, “a handbill
written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the
name and address of the author add little, if anything, to the
reader’s ability to evaluate the document’s message. Thus, Ohio’s
informational interest is plainly insufficient to support the
constitutionality of its disclosure requirement.”156
Furthermore, not only may additional information be useless
in actually informing voters, it may be acutely detrimental in
conveying an accurate message. If the speaker’s identity is
disclosed, the issue the message supports may suffer from prejudice
merely upon the basis of who speaks in its favor.157 Conversely, the
message may be disregarded without having been read or heard
solely due to the identity of the speaker.158 In neither of these
situations are the merits of the speech considered.
Therefore, the Buckley exception to disclosure for minor-party
members who face threats, harassment, or reprisals due to
disclosure of their identities, should be satisfied by showing a
reasonable probability of the severity of harm as seen in
ProtectMarriage.com and Hollingsworth rather than that seen in
Patterson. Moreover, unless disclosure results in a more informed
electorate, the state’s interest is not sufficient to overcome the
Buckley minor-party exception.
C. Defining the Strength of Associational Speech in Relation to
Other Methods of Speech
The freedom of association is unquestionably a form of speech
protected by the First Amendment.159 However, it is unclear how
strong this form of speech is, and therefore the level of protection it
	
  
156. Id. at 348–49.
157. Id. at 342–43.
Anonymity . . . provides a way for a writer who may be personally
unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply
because they do not like its proponent. Thus, even in the field of political
rhetoric, where “the identity of the speaker is an important component of
many attempts to persuade,” the most effective advocates have sometimes
opted for anonymity.
Id. (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994)).
158. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342–43.
159. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (explaining that the “freedom to engage in association” is
“inseparable” from the “liberty” assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech).
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deserves in comparison to other forms of speech is likewise unclear.
This problem arises, in part, because one may associate with a
group through membership or by monetary contribution. This
Note posits association by membership deserves greater protection
than association through monetary means.
Further, that
association by membership is as strong as, and therefore deserves
the same degree of protection, as the express speech at issue in
McIntyre.
There are at least two ways to examine the effects of First
Amendment infringements: first, to focus on the actual individual
speaker; second, to focus on public deliberation as a whole.160
When individuals are deterred from associating with like-minded
fellows, the views of the group as a whole are thereby suppressed.161
Suppression of associational speech may serve as an absolute bar to
minority or dissident views from entering the public discourse, both
of which should be encouraged and embraced in a democracy.162
Associational speech for minority or dissident groups may be
suppressed in numerous ways.163 The court in Brown applied and
enforced Buckley’s minor-party exception largely because the
“potential for impairing First Amendment interests is substantially
greater”164 regarding minor parties because
These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base
and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In
some instances fears of reprisals may deter contributions to the
point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest
also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent
reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within and
without the political arena.165

	
  
160. Ho, supra note 152, at 412–13 (defining the former as the “anti-chilling”
interpretation while the latter as the “anti-suppression” interpretation).
161. See Ho, supra note 152, at 412–13.
162. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) (“There is, of course, no
reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the right to have
people vote for or against them. Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at
the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.”); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating there exists a “profound national
commitment . . . that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen . . . .”).
163. By way of example, using threats, harassment, or reprisals to dissuade
individuals from associating with, participating in, or donating to these minority or
dissident groups.
164. Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 92
(1982).
165. Id. at 93 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976) (per curiam)).
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Brown is supported by the Court’s statement in Patterson that
“[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association.”166
Conversely, the Court rejected a freedom of association
defense when the petitioner in Barenblatt v. United States refused
to answer certain questions asked by the Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities.167 The questions
included, “Are you now a member of the Communist Party?” and
“Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?”168 The
Court observed, “Where First Amendment rights are asserted to
bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always
involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and
public interests at stake . . . .”169 Congress was deemed to have
“wide power to legislate in the field of Communist activity . . . and
to conduct appropriate investigations in aid thereof.”170 The Court
made no secret that its decision rested on prejudice based upon
associational ties when it stated,
To suggest that because the Communist Party may also sponsor
peaceable political reforms the constitutional issues before us
should now be judged as if that Party were just an ordinary
political party from the standpoint of national security, is to ask
this Court to blind itself to world affairs which have determined
the whole course of our national policy since the close of World
War II . . . .171

The Court concluded “the balance between the individual and the
governmental interests here at stake must be struck in favor of the
latter, and that therefore the provisions of the First Amendment
have not been offended.”172
Yet the dissent was critical of the Court’s disregard of the
Constitution based upon its stereotype that Communists did not
constitute a political party, but rather a criminal gang.173
	
  
166. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
167. Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109, 113 (1959). While Barenblatt is
undoubtedly an outlier, it illustrates how contemporary politics may cause disregard of
First Amendment rights.
168. Id. at 114.
169. Id. at 126.
170. Id. at 127.
171. Id. at 128–29.
172. Id. at 134 (Black, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 146.
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Furthermore, that because some members of the Communist Party
pursued illegal aims, not all members did so.174 Instead, Justice
Black saw the potential slippery slope for First Amendment
violations created by the majority.175 “[O]nce we allow any group
which has some political aims or ideas to be driven from the ballot
and from the battle for men’s minds because some of its members
are bad and some of its tenets are illegal, no group is safe.”176
These instances illustrate the necessity of including
associational speech within the purview of the First Amendment.
Great injustice will arise when that right is infringed.177 Thus, to
avoid grievous inequity, associational speech should be afforded
the same level of protection as express speech.
The Court in Buckley stated that associational advocacy was
less effective without the ability to pool funds obtained by
contributions.178 It further stated the “privacy of belief” may be
invaded when the disclosed information concerns memberships as
well as monetary contributions because “‘[f]inancial transactions
can reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and
beliefs.’”179 Conversely, the Court in McIntyre emphasized “money
may ‘talk,’ [but] its speech is less specific, less personal, and less
provocative than a handbill.”180
These points of analysis are in accord with each other when
viewing the independent nature of the respective form of
expression. Group membership, like verbal speech or writing, is an
independent act that allows one to directly associate. On the other
hand, contributing money lacks the same degree of independence.
It is a dissociative (albeit supportive) act. When an individual is a
	
  
174. Id. at 147.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 150. Justice Black went further and illustrated prior instances of
baseless prejudice throughout American history, including: Socialists in the 1920s,
Masons in the 1830s, and Jacobins in the time of the alien sedition laws. Id. at 150–51.
“[I]n times of high emotional excitement minority parties and groups which advocate
extremely unpopular social or governmental innovations will always be typed as
criminal gangs and attempts will always be made to drive them out.” Id. at 151.
177. See, e.g., Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
178. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1976) (per curiam) (“The right to join
together ‘for the advancement of beliefs and ideas,’ is diluted if it does not include the
right to pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential if ‘advocacy’ is
to be truly or optimally ‘effective.’” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored
People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)) (internal citations omitted)).
179. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66 (quoting California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 78–79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)) (alteration in original).
180. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995).
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group member, she then has a personal, unique interest in the
views expressed by the group and the group itself—whereas a
second individual who supports a group by monetary means has
less skin in the game as that support may be quantified and
matched by any other individual by an equal donation.181
Inverse to the degree of independence are the states’ interests
in having an informed electorate, avoiding the appearance of
corruption, and actual corruption.182 As the independence of
speech increases, the state’s interest in disclosure decreases, and
vice versa. For example when a person contributes money to a
candidate, the state has a strong interest in ensuring that candidate
is not held indebted to her supporter. On the other hand, when
another person expresses her opinion on an issue that candidates
have taken opposing sides on, the state’s interest in the speaker’s
identity dwindles. It is imperative that an individual who expresses
her opinion be able to do so. That necessity ensures an individual’s
self-autonomy as well as a robust marketplace of ideas.183
Therefore, associational speech based on membership should be
afforded the same safeguards as other forms of speech.
D. Patterson Was Impliedly Embraced by Citizens United

Citizens United generally represents the Court’s recent trend
of favoring disclosure requirements.184 While compelled disclosure
is a restriction on speech, it is often justified.185 Just as the right to
speak is not absolute, nor are the justifications that restrict
	
  
181. For example, for several years the Boy Scouts of America has been mired in
controversy regarding its policy to not allow openly gay adults to serve in its
organization. Erik Eckholm, Boy Scouts’ President Calls for End to Ban on Gay
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/us/boyscouts-president-calls-for-end-to-ban-on-gay-leaders.html. If an individual were to
donate money in support of this policy (or in support of its revocation), he would have
less of a personal, unique interest in his support for the Boy Scouts than if he joined the
organization as a volunteer.
182. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
183. See Ho, supra note 152, at 413–18 (discussing anti-chilling of self-autonomy
and anti-suppression of the marketplace of ideas). See also McGeveran, supra note 12
at 877–78 (“Many individuals whose opinions differ from those around them will put
their heads down and disengage from political activity if that is the only way to avoid
disclosure.”). Interestingly, Professor McGeveran posits the social ostracism that may
result for Democrats in vastly Republican locales and Republicans in deep blue
territory may be sufficient to invoke exemption from disclosure. McGeveran, supra
note 12, at 878.
184. See, e.g., John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). See also Ho, supra note 152, at 418 (“[C]ourts
have typically favored disclosure in the campaign finance context.”).
185. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
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speech.186 One avenue in which disclosure may be circumnavigated
involves minor group associations.187
Although Citizens United was decided with no mention of
Patterson, it impliedly fits within the Citizens United framework.
The Court in Citizens United reaffirmed the Buckley principle
regarding disclosure by holding an informational interest was solely
sufficient to affirm the disclosure provisions at issue.188 Moreover,
it applied the Buckley minor-party exception but found insufficient
evidence to satisfy the standard for exception.189 Nevertheless,
Citizens United did not reference Patterson once, despite its
relevance, while the Court in Buckley relied heavily upon
Patterson when it created these standards.190 “The strict test
established by Patterson is necessary because compelled disclosure
has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First
Amendment rights.”191
In fact, the minor party exception was created as an exception
to the three categories of government interests that were found
sufficient to overcome Patterson’s freedom of association
justification.192 Buckley stated that the minor party exception
would not apply when threats, harassment, or reprisals were
“highly speculative” in infringing First Amendment rights.193
Therefore, as Citizens United applied the exception test, it
impliedly embraced Patterson. As a result, freedom of association
arguments as used in Patterson and its progeny are alive and well
to be utilized in challenges against compelled disclosure statutes.
III. APPLYING CURRENT LAW TO CONNECTICUT AND
MASSACHUSETTS
A. Connecticut’s Response to Citizens United: P.A. 13-180
In 2013, Connecticut Governor Dannel Malloy signed Public
Act No. 13-180, An Act Concerning Disclosure of Independent
Expenditures and Changes to Other Campaign Finance Laws and
Election Laws (“Act”), into law, which significantly amended
	
  
186. Id. at 69.
187. See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Ala. ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
188. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010).
189. Id. at 370.
190. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
191. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
192. Id. at 66, 69–70.
193. Id. at 70.
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Connecticut’s campaign finance disclosure provisions.194 He stated
Citizens United was “a tragic decision,” but is the reason he signed
the bill.195 The purpose of the Act was to make sure that people
who are trying to hide their speech . . . have to disclose”196 and to
allow “the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper
weight to different speakers and messages . . . [and] help to shine
light on that money so that we know who is behind it and where it
is corning from.”197
The National Institute on Money in State Politics conducted a
survey of all fifty states to research how stringent each state’s laws
were regarding disclosure requirements for independent spending,
giving Connecticut an “A.”198 Despite Connecticut’s then-strong
disclosure requirements, the Connecticut General Assembly still
felt the need, in response to Citizens United, to enact sweeping
legislation.199
Under current Connecticut law that incorporates PA 13-180, a
person200 may make an independent expenditure201 of an unlimited
amount, but must file specific disclosure statements electronically
with the state when the aggregate amount exceeds one thousand
	
  
194. See 2013 Conn. Acts 718 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9).
195. Pazniokas, supra note 13.
196. 56 S. Proc., Pt. 25, 2013 Sess., p. 4734 (Conn. 2013), (remarks of Senator
Anthony Musto)
197. 56 H.R. Proc., Pt. 25, 2013 Sess., p. 8404 (Conn. 2013), (remarks of
Representative Ed Jutila).
198. Scorecard: Essential Disclosure Requirements for Independent Spending,
2013, FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG (May 16, 2013), http://classic.followthemoney.org//
press/ReportView.phtml?r=495 [http://perma.cc/28VN-EBFZ]. Massachusetts was also
given an “A.” Id.
199. Id.; See generally 56 H.R. Proc., Pt. 25, 2013 Sess., p. 8404 (Conn. 2013); 56
S. Proc., Pt. 15, 2013 Sess., p. 4765 (Conn. 2013).
200. “‘Person’ means an individual, committee, firm, partnership, organization,
association, syndicate, company trust, corporation, limited liability company or any
other legal entity of any kind but does not mean the state or any political or
administrative subdivision of the state.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601(10) (2015).
201. “‘[I]ndependent expenditure’ means an expenditure . . . that is made without
the consent, coordination, or consultation of, a candidate or agent of the candidate,
candidate committee, political committee or party committee.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9601c(a) (2015);
“[E]xpenditure” means . . . [a]ny purchase, payment, distribution, loan,
advance, deposit or gift of money or anything of value, when made to
promote the success or defeat of any candidate seeking the nomination for
election, or election, of any person or for the purpose of aiding or
promoting the success or defeat of any referendum question or the success
or defeat of any political party.
Id. § 9-601b(a)(1) (2015).
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dollars, provided it is within the time frame of a primary or general
election campaign.202 However, if the person makes or obligates to
make an independent expenditure the disclosure statement is made
on a “long-form” and “short-form” report.203 The long-form
requirements include the “name of the person making or obligating
to make” the expenditure; the mailing address and business address
if different than the mailing address of that same person; the name
of the candidate(s) the expenditure is meant to support or oppose;
and the name, phone number, and email address of the individual
filing the report.204 The short-form requirements include the
“name of the person making or obligating to make” the
expenditure; the amount of the expenditure; a description of the
expenditure; and the name, phone number, and email address of
the individual filing the report.205 The long-form is used for a
person’s initial independent expenditure, while the short-form is
used for any subsequent independent expenditure.206
Additionally, the Act created a new category of monetary
transfer called a “covered transfer.”207 A covered transfer is “any
donation, transfer or payment of funds by a person to another
person if the person receiving the donation, transfer or payment
makes independent expenditures or transfers funds to another
	
  
202. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601d(a) (2015).
“General election campaign” means (A) in the case of a candidate
nominated at a primary, the period beginning on the day following the
primary and ending on the date the treasurer files the final statement for
such campaign . . . or (B) in the case of a candidate nominated without a
primary, the period beginning on the day following the day on which the
candidate is nominated and ending on the date the treasurer files the final
statement for such campaign . . . .
Id. § 9-700(7) (2015).
“Primary campaign” means the period beginning on the day following the
close of (A) a convention held . . . for the purpose of endorsing a candidate
for nomination to the office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney
General, State Comptroller, State Treasurer or Secretary of the State or
the district office of state senator or state representative, or (B) a caucus,
convention or town committee meeting held . . . for the purpose of
endorsing a candidate for the municipal office of state senator or state
representative, whichever is applicable, and ending on the day of a primary
held for the purpose of nominating a candidate for such office.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-700(11) (2015).
203. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601d(b) (2015).
204. Id. § 9-601d(c) (emphasis added).
205. Id. § 9-601d(d) (emphasis added).
206. Id. § 9-601d(b) (2015). The purpose of having two forms is to reduce the
amount of paperwork required by the filing person. See 56 S. Proc., Pt. 15, 2013 Sess.,
p. 4765 (Conn. 2013), (remarks of Senator Anthony Musto).
207. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601(29)(A) (2015).
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person who makes independent expenditures.”208 A person must
disclose the source of a covered transfer, the amount received when
that person received the covered transfer during the preceding
twelve month period before a primary or general election, and “is
made or obligated to be made on or after the date that is one
hundred eighty days prior to such primary or election.”209
B. Massachusetts’ Response to Citizens United: H. 4366
House Bill number 4366, An Act relative to campaign finance
disclosure and transparency (hereinafter “H. 4366”),210 was signed
into law by Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick on August 1,
2014.211 Unlike Connecticut’s Act, Massachusetts’ was heralded as
“an excellent first challenge to Citizens United,”212 while Governor
Patrick stated it was “exactly right” conceptually.213 Under current
Massachusetts law, all individuals, groups, and entities that make
an independent expenditure214 that is greater than two hundred
	
  
208. Id.
209. Id. § 9-601d(f)(1).
210. An Act relative to campaign finance disclosure and transparency, ch. 210,
2014 Mass. Legis. Serv. 683 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 55)
211. Shira Schoenberg, Gov. Deval Patrick Signs Super PAC Disclosure Law,
MASS LIVE, (Aug. 4, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/
08/gov_deval_patrick_signs_super.html#incart_related_stories [http://perma.cc/4A433X2N].
212. Schoenberg, supra note 13 (quoting Rep. Linda Campbell Democratic vice
chair of the Joint Committee on Election Laws).
213. Schoenberg, supra note 210.
214. Massachusetts defines an independent expenditure as:
[A]n expenditure made or liability incurred by an individual, group,
association, corporation, labor union, political committee or other entity as
payment for goods or services to expressly advocate the election or defeat
of a clearly identified candidate; provided, however, that the expenditure is
made or incurred without cooperation or consultation with any candidate
or a nonelected political committee organized on behalf of the candidate or
an agent of the candidate and is not made or incurred in concert with or at
the request or suggestion of the candidate, a nonelected political
committee organized on behalf of the candidate or agent of the candidate.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 1 (Supp. 2015).
“Expenditure,” [is] any expenditure of money, or anything of value, by an
individual, candidate, or political committee, or a person acting on behalf
of said individual, candidate, or political committee, for the purpose of
influencing the nomination or election of said individual or candidate, or of
presidential and vice presidential electors, or for the purpose of promoting
or opposing a charter change, referendum question, constitutional
amendment, or other question submitted to the voters, and shall include:
(1) any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of
money, or anything of value; and (2) any transfer of money or anything of
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fifty dollars in the aggregate, during any calendar year, and the
express purpose of such expenditure is for or against a candidate,
must disclose: the name and address of the individual, group, or
entity making the expenditure; the identification of the candidate
the expenditure supports or opposes; “the name and address of any
person to whom the expenditure was made”; the value of the
expenditure; and its purpose and date.215
However, the bill also has its critics.216 When addressing a
portion of the new law that requires disclosure of donors to nonprofit groups, that were exempt under the previous law, Paul
Craney of the Massachusetts Fiscal Alliance stated, “[i]t’s just there
to intimidate donors so that they don’t give to organizations, or if
they do give to organizations, those organizations are reluctant to
participate in the democratic process in educating the public on
how lawmakers vote.”217

C. P.A. 13-180 and Bill H. 4366 Inadvertently Invite As-Applied
First Amendment Challenges
Connecticut’s P.A. 13-180 and Massachusetts’ H. 4366 each are
susceptible to as-applied challenges by minority advocates due to
infringement of their freedom to associate. The Citizens United
framework makes these challenges possible due to its use of the
Buckley minor-party exception. Further, these challenges do not
need to show a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or
reprisals amounting to that seen in Patterson, but instead to that
seen in ProtectMarriage.com and Hollingsworth.
Connecticut’s new designation of a covered transfer has farreaching implications. Under Connecticut law prior to P.A. 13-180,
disclaimers218 were only required to appear with independent
expenditures when they promoted or discouraged an electoral
candidate’s election or defeat, promoted or discouraged election or
defeat of a political party, or solicited funds on behalf of a political
	
  
value between political committees.

Id.
215. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 18A (Supp. 2015).
216. Shoenberg, supra note 12.
217. Shoenberg, supra note 12.
218. Disclaimer is used in the statute to reference disclosed information that
appears with the independent expenditure, as opposed to a more general disclosure,
which would appear in documents filed with the Secretary of the State for public
record. See Conn. Acts 718 (2013) (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9).
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action committee (PAC) or political party.219 Now, they must
appear on every independent expenditure that references a
political candidate.220 If the independent expenditure was made
within ninety days of a primary or general election the disclaimer
required the names of the five individuals who made the largest
covered transfer in the aggregate within the twelve months
preceding the primary or general election.221
The
disclosure
requirements
regarding
independent
expenditures and covered transfers are problematic because they
are based upon the proximity between when the expenditure is
made and the dates of a primary or general election.222 In effect, a
person who has received a covered transfer(s) of the specified
aggregate amount must count backwards from the date of the
primary or general election in order to determine the level of
disclosure applicable to that person when the independent
expenditure is made.223 As a result, there is uncertainty as to when
disclosure must be made.224 Issues such as these adversely affect
individuals’ and small organizations’ abilities to comply with the
applicable statute, thus being subject to statutory penalty which
may include fines or incarceration, merely as a result of engaging in
political advocacy.
Similarly, there is another disparity that makes statutory
compliance less burdensome for larger and well-funded
organizations. Section 9-601b(b)(13) defines any “lawful
communication” by a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) group as not amounting
to an expenditure.225 As a result, those communications do not
require disclosure of any information about the 501(c)(3) group, its
members, or contributors. Whereas a minor group or individual,
	
  
219. See Conn. Acts 718 (2013) (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9).
220. See id.
221. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-621 (2015).
222. See id. § 9-601d(b), (f)(1) (2015).
223. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601d(b), (f)(1) (2015). See Administration of
Independent Expenditure Disclosure Requirements Under Public Act 13-180,
Declaratory Ruling 2013-01 (Conn. State Elections Enforcement Commission Nov. 20,
2013), http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/laws_and_regulations/declaratory_ruling_201301_-_independent_expenditures_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/E6NF-WSLS].
224. See Administration of Independent Expenditure Disclosure Requirements
Under Public Act 13-180, Declaratory Ruling 2013-01 (Conn. State Elections
Enforcement Commission Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/laws_and_
regulations/declaratory_ruling_2013-01_-_independent_expenditures_final.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E6NF-WSLS].
225. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-601b(b)(13) (2015).
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such as Margaret McIntyre, is unlikely to have the funds or
knowledge to comply with the statutory requirements, a larger
group will. Thus the statute in effect incentivizes anonymity for
large groups and deters minor group participation.
Additionally, the new law creates a further disclosure burden
in adding the phrase “or obligates to make” to “makes” regarding
when a long and short form must be filed with the state. The
phrase “or obligates to make” has been declared226 to mean the
disclosure report may be required at a point in time before a
person actually spends her funds on an independent expenditure.227
The effect is that persons and groups that advocate dissident
viewpoints stand to face threats, harassment, and reprisals before
they even make an independent expenditure. Consequently, these
individuals and groups may be deterred from even fulfilling their
obligation to make an independent expenditure.
Massachusetts’ H. 4366 is less stringent than Connecticut’s
P.A. 13-180. While H. 4366 requires filing a report with the state
by an individual or entity that makes an independent expenditure
that exceeds two hundred fifty dollars in the aggregate, it has no
statutory designation synonymous to Connecticut’s covered
transfer.228
Alternatively, § 18A categorizes a group an
“independent expenditure PAC” when it receives contributions
that are then used to make independent expenditures.229
When a group is deemed an independent expenditure PAC, it
must disclose the name and address of the person who made the
contribution, and is then also subject to the disclose provisions
applicable to other political action committees.230 The further
disclosure then required includes: the name and address of every
person who contributed fifty dollars or more during the reporting
period; the name and address of every person who contributed, in
the aggregate, fifty dollars or more during the reporting period; and
the name and address of every person who contributed, in the
	
  
226. There is no statutory definition for the term “obligate.”
227. See Administration Construction of the Phrase “Make or Obligate to
Make” as Applied to Disclosure of Independent Expenditures, Declaratory Ruling
2014-01 (Conn. State Elections Enforcement Commission Mar. 19, 2014),
http://www.ct.gov/seec/lib/seec/laws_and_regulations/final_signed_declaratory_ruling_2
014-01.pdf [http://perma.cc/K7E4-K6R5].
228. See An Act relative to campaign finance disclosure and transparency, ch.
210, 2014 Mass. Legis. Serv. 683 (West) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 55).
229. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 18A(d) (Supp. 2015).
230. Id. § 18A(a)–(b), (d).
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aggregate, fifty dollars or more during the calendar year.231 The
result is that an individual’s identity must be disclosed when she
contributes fifty total dollars within a calendar year and those funds
are subsequently used by the donee to make an independent
expenditure. To some, merely disclosing a residential or business
address seems a minor inconvenience. To those expressing
controversial viewpoints, though, this disclosure risks threats,
harassment, and reprisals.232
The new acts stand to discourage individuals from contributing
to advocacy organizations merely because their identity may be
disclosed. The impact of the new law in effect requires the
identifying information of individuals who reached an aggregate
amount within a full year prior to a primary or general election.
CONCLUSION
Both Connecticut and Massachusetts have recently enacted
sweeping election law reform with the intention, in part, of keeping
“dark money” out of electoral politics. While an important
objective, both have done so in a fashion that undermines
democracy by inadvertently suppressing associational speech of
minorities and dissidents.
The Supreme Court recognized in Patterson the freedom to
associate. The Court demanded that the freedom to associate
allow those in the minority to express their dissident views without
fear of threats, harassment, or reprisals. Accordingly, associational
speech is a means of expression as well as a defense against
suppression, and therefore must be granted the same constitutional
protection as express speech.
The Court in Buckley created an exception to compelled
disclosure for minor parties who face a reasonable probability of
	
  
231. Id. § 18.
232. With today’s technology, one may continually harass another from the
convenience of one’s own home by ordering “glitter bombs” sent to another. See, e.g.,
RUINDAYS, http://www.ruindays.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). That service proudly
states,
We at RuinDays.com believe that anyone that has ever wronged you
should pay. We discreetly and anonymously package the most annoying
things possible to receive through mail, and ship them to your worst
enemies, in an effort to ruin their day. Just give us their name and address.
We’ll take care of the rest.
Id. Undoubtedly, a crude prank service such as RuinDays—which will mail packages
that include exploding glitter and fake smelling feces—ordinarily only arises to an
inconvenience. However, it illustrates how easily one may harass another when
knowing only that person’s name and address.	
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threat, harassment, or reprisal if their identities were disclosed.
However, the Court has not been clear what degree of threat,
harassment, or reprisal is necessary to invoke this exception and
consequently, has passively denied claims by minorities because
they could not provide evidence that their harassment equaled that
seen in Patterson.
The Supreme Court must create a clear standard to satisfy the
Buckley exception for threats, harassment, or reprisals that
conforms to contemporary instances of such. Until the Court does
so, Connecticut and Massachusetts face the likelihood of as-applied
challenges based upon unconstitutional associational infringement.

